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LLOYD K. GARRISON LECTURE

Inside EPA:
A Former Insider’s Reflections on the
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and
the Obama White House*
LISA HEINZERLING**
I will be discussing the relationship between the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the White House.
I will focus specifically on the role that the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), within the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”), plays in reviewing the EPA’s
regulatory output.
As I will explain, OIRA’s actual practice in reviewing agency
rules departs considerably from the structure created by the
executive order governing OIRA’s process of regulatory review.1
The distribution of decision-making authority is ad hoc and
chaotic rather than predictable and ordered; the rules reviewed
are mostly not economically significant but rather, in many cases,
are merely of special interest to OIRA staffers; rules fail OIRA
This essay is an expanded version of remarks delivered on March 12, 2013, as
the Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law at Pace Law School.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author was Senior
Climate Policy Counsel to EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson from January to
July 2009, and Associate Administrator of the Office of Policy from July 2009 to
December 2010. This essay is based on public documents and the author’s
experience in those positions.
1. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). EO 12,866, issued by
President Clinton in 1993, continues – in principle – to govern the mechanics of
OIRA review. President Obama issued his own executive order, EO 13,563, on
OIRA review in 2011, but that order reaffirmed EO 12,866 and did not by its
terms change the process of OIRA review (such as deadlines and disclosure
requirements) in any respect. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2011).
*

325

1

HEINZERLING - FINAL- NUMBERED

326

3/26/2014 11:23 AM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

review for a variety of reasons, some extra-legal and some simply
mysterious; there are no longer any meaningful deadlines for
OIRA review; and OIRA does not follow – or allow agencies to
follow – most of the transparency requirements of the relevant
executive order.2
Describing the OIRA process as it actually operates today
goes a long way toward previewing the substantive problems with
it. The process is utterly opaque. It rests on assertions of
decision-making authority that are inconsistent with the statutes
the agencies administer. The process diffuses power to such an
extent – acceding, depending on the situation, to the views of
other Cabinet officers, career staff in other agencies, White House
economic offices, members of Congress, the White House Chief of
Staff, OIRA career staff, and many more – that at the end of the
day, no one is accountable for the results it demands (or blocks, in
the case of the many rules stalled during the OIRA process).
And, through it all, environmental rules take a particular
beating, from the number of such rules reviewed to the scrutiny
they receive to the changes they suffer in the course of the
process.3
These problems are significant, and they deserve serious
attention. Although I discuss these problems at the end of this
paper, my main objective in this paper is descriptive.
Misunderstandings of the OIRA process abound. Too often these
misunderstandings are perpetuated by, or not contradicted by,
the very personnel who have been involved in the process.
Indeed, after I finished a stint as the head of the EPA office
responsible for acting as the primary EPA liaison to OIRA, I did
not write at any length about my experiences with OIRA review.
Partly out of continuing loyalty to the administration that had
made my time in government possible, partly out of respect for
the sensitivity of interactions between high-level government
officers, and partly out of a sense of sheer futility,4 I had resolved
to move on to other topics. But when accounts of OIRA’s role in
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See Lisa Heinzerling, Towards Engaged Scholarship, PACE L. REV.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
19-20),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2225283.
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the Obama administration began to emerge from other quarters,5
and when these accounts, in many respects, did not jibe with my
own experience, I decided to resurface and to describe the OIRA
process from my perspective. Hence the account that follows.
I.

THE HISTORY OF WHITE HOUSE REVIEW

It will be useful first to give a brief history of White House
review of agencies’ regulatory actions. Some form of centralized
review of agency action has been with us for decades. Such
review took place episodically in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter
administrations.6 But, it was during the presidency of Ronald
Reagan that the practice of regulatory review began to take on
the shape it has today.
A. Executive Order 12,291
In one of his earliest acts as President, Ronald Reagan issued
an executive order – Executive Order 12,291 – that gave
centralized review more systematized form in two respects.7
First, Executive Order (“EO”) 12,291 put a specific office – OMB8
– in charge of reviewing agency actions.9 Second, it adopted costbenefit analysis as the governing framework for this review.10
5. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013)
[hereinafter SIMPLER]. See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2013)
[hereinafter Myths and Realities].
6. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, President X and the New (Approved)
Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 536-37 (1986) (describing “rather modest
and unintrusive” efforts by the White House to control agencies during the
1970s). See Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House
Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 239-42 (2012) (providing
a more detailed discussion).
7. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).
8. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS ch. 1.2(c) (1997), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_chap1 (within OMB, OIRA was the
office responsible for regulatory review). From here on out in this article, I will
refer to “OMB” only where I mean to distinguish OMB from OIRA or where (as
in the Office of Legal Counsel opinion I am about to discuss) another party has
referred to OMB rather than to OIRA.
9. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).
10. Id. § 2(b)-(c).
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Before President Reagan issued EO 12,291, the Office of
Legal Counsel (“OLC”) reviewed the order for legal soundness.11
Notably, OLC’s opinion confirming the order’s legality rested on
the premise that the centralized reviewers (OMB and a newly
created Task Force on Regulatory Relief) would only supervise,
and not displace, the exercise of discretion given to the agencies
by statute. OLC wrote: “[T]he fact that the President has both
constitutional and implied statutory authority to supervise
decision-making by executive agencies . . . suggest[s] . . . that
supervision is more readily justified when it does not purport
wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which
Congress has allocated to a particular subordinate official. A
wholesale displacement might be held inconsistent with the
statute vesting authority in the relevant official. . .. The order
does not empower the [OMB] Director or the Task Force to
displace the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory
functions or in assessing and weighing the costs and benefits of
proposed actions.”12
OLC’s opinion does not state that an order displacing the
agencies’ discretion would certainly be illegal. But it does
interpret EO 12,291 not to permit such displacement and it does
suggest a potential legal problem with such displacement.
Reading only EO 12,291 and the OLC’s opinion on it, one would
conclude that agencies retained the decision-making discretion
they were given by the statutes they are charged with
administering.
In practice, though, it was not that simple. During the
Reagan years, critics charged that OIRA did indeed displace –
and not merely supervise – agencies’ decision-making
discretion.13 In addition, OIRA’s process of review frequently
11. See Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op.
O.L.C. 59 (1981).
12. Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have
Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
2487, 2502-05 (2011). Percival cites a wealth of sources on this point. Id. at
2504, n. 127. Beyond OIRA, Reagan’s appointees to the environmental agencies
also were quite willing to take deregulatory actions on their own initiative. See
generally Philip Weinberg, Masquerade for Privilege: Deregulation Undermining
Environmental Protection, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1321 (1988).
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delayed agency rules for extended periods.14 The process also at
times degenerated into one in which OIRA served as a conduit for
the views of industry on particular regulatory actions.15 This
feature of the process was especially troubling insofar as the
process was opaque. Only in 1986 did OIRA begin to make public
the documents shared by outside parties with OIRA during its
review.16 Even so, the bulk of the process – which agency actions
went to OIRA, what happened to them while they were there,
who made the decisions – was closed off to the public.17
Moreover, the cost-benefit lens through which OIRA viewed
agency rules proved to skew against some kinds of rules, in
particular environmental rules, since so many of the benefits of
environmental rules are difficult or impossible to quantify and
monetize, and since so many of these benefits occur in the future
while the settled practice of cost-benefit analysis is to steeply
discount future consequences.18
Such critiques dogged the OIRA review process under EO
12,291 through the Reagan years and into the presidency of
George H.W. Bush.19 By the time Bill Clinton came into office in
1993, many were hoping for change.20 Within months of taking
office, President Clinton responded with a new executive order on
regulatory review, EO 12,866.21

14. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency
Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 565-68 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Claudia O’Brien, White House Review of Regulations Under the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 51, 58-80 (1993).
16. Bruff, supra note 14, at 582 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES SUBJECT TO
EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 12,291 AND 12,498, SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES
CONCERNING OIRA REVIEWS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 12,291 AND 12,498
(June 13, 1986)).
17. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking:
The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1067-68 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory
Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1293-97 (1987).
19. See generally RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 189 (2008).
20. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995).
21. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
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B. Executive Order 12,866
Although EO 12,866 preserved the status quo in that it
continued to require centralized White House review of agency
actions under a cost-benefit framework, it also reformed several
specific features of this review that had proved troublesome.
Taking on the issue of displacement, an early passage in EO
12,866 “reaffirm[ed] the primacy of Federal agencies in the
At the same time,
regulatory decision-making process.”22
however, the order for the first time explicitly stated that if a
conflict arose between OIRA and an agency over a particular
matter that could not be resolved by the OMB Director and the
agency head, it would be the President (or the Vice-President
acting on the President’s behalf) who would settle the dispute –
and make the “decision with respect to the matter.”23 EO 12,866
also provided a specific framework for elevating decisions beyond
OMB and the agency head: the Vice-President (then Al Gore) was
to make recommendations to the President on how to resolve the
conflict.24 EO 12,866 thus gestured toward the primacy of the
agencies while simultaneously – for the first time in such an
order – explicitly providing that the President would decide the
hardest cases and laying out the process to follow when conflicts
arose.25
Addressing the problem of delay, EO 12,866 set out specific
time limits on OIRA review. Advance notices of proposed
rulemaking, notices of inquiry, and “other preliminary regulatory
actions prior to a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” were to be
reviewed within 10 days.26
Regulatory actions previously
reviewed by OIRA were to be reviewed within 45 days if “there
has been no material change in the facts and circumstances upon
which the regulatory action is based.”27 “[A]ll other regulatory
actions” were to be reviewed within 90 days.28 EO 12,866 also
22. Id. at 638.
23. Id. § 7.
24. Id.
25. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 228890 (2001).
26. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(A), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
27. Id. § 6(b)(2)(B).
28. Id.
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provided that the review process could be extended “(1) once by no
more than 30 calendar days upon the written approval of the
Director and (2) at the request of the agency head.”29 This
provision allowing extensions seems, with its use of the word
“and” rather than “or,” to contemplate a process whereby both the
OMB Director and the agency head would need to agree on the
extension. Together, the new deadlines, precisely defined and
tailored to specific circumstances, were clearly designed to end
OIRA review that dragged on intolerably long or even
indefinitely.
In addition, EO 12,866 limited the range of rules OIRA could
review.
Only “significant” regulatory actions were to be
30
Economically significant actions – those having
reviewed.
annual costs of $100 million or more31 – were to be accompanied
by extensive cost-benefit analysis.32 Beyond annual costs, other
features that might make a regulatory action significant (and
thus subject to OIRA review) were serious inconsistencies with
another agency’s plans,33 material effects on budgetary impacts of
various programs,34 and the presence of “novel legal or policy
issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or
the principles set forth in this Executive order.”35 The OIRA
Administrator was given the final say as to which regulatory
actions qualify as significant and thus must be reviewed by
OIRA.36
EO 12,866 also took on the problem of OIRA acting as a
conduit for industry views. The order required disclosure of all
contacts with outside parties during the period of OIRA review.37
The order limited the conditions under which outside views could
be relayed to OIRA by requiring that only the Administrator of
OIRA or “a particular designee” could receive oral
communications by persons outside the executive branch
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. § 6(b)(2)(C).
Id. § 6(a)(3)(B).
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
Id. § 6(a)(3)(C).
Id. § 3(f)(2).
Id. § 3(f)(3).
Id. § 3(f)(4).
Id. § 6(b)(3).
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(B)(iii), (C)(ii)-(iii), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
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regarding the substance of a regulatory action under review.38
The order also provided that in the case of elevation to the
President or Vice-President, any communications by outside
parties, directed at the President’s advisors or their staffs or the
staff of the Vice-President, would be in writing and would become
part of the public docket.39 If the communication was not in
writing, the advisors or staff members were to “inform the outside
party that the matter is under review and that any comments
should be submitted in writing.”40
In other ways as well, EO 12,866 aimed to make OIRA
review far more transparent than it had been. In fact, the order
requires transparency throughout the OIRA process. If an
agency plans a regulatory action that OIRA thinks is inconsistent
with the President’s policies or priorities, OIRA must tell the
agency so, in writing.41 If a regulatory action is under review,
OIRA must provide information – in a “publicly available log” –
about the status of that action.42 If a dispute arises between
OIRA and an agency over whether a particular rule should issue,
and one of these parties requests resolution of the dispute by the
President or Vice-President, OIRA must note – in a “publicly
available log” – who requested elevation and when.43 If OIRA
returns a rule to an agency “for further consideration of some or
all of its provisions,” the Administrator of OIRA must provide a
“written explanation” for this return.44 If a regulatory proposal
changes between the time it goes to OIRA and the time it
emerges from OIRA, the agency must identify those changes (“in
a complete, clear, and simple manner”).45 If OIRA insists on
changes to the regulatory proposal during its review, the agency
must identify those changes for the public (“in plain,
understandable language”).46

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. § 6(b)(4)(A).
Id. § 7.
Id.
Id. § 4(c)(5).
Id. § 6(b)(4)(C)(i).
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(C)(i), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
Id. § 6(b)(3).
Id. § 6(a)(3)(E)(ii).
Id. § 6(a)(3)(E)(iii).
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If followed (an important qualification, as we will see), these
disclosure requirements would allow the public to know, often in
real time, what actions are under review at OIRA, what the
status of those actions is, and what the consequences of the
review have been for any particular agency action.
A final refinement of EO 12,866 was the explicit inclusion, in
the prescribed cost-benefit framework, of “qualitative measures of
costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless
essential to consider” and of benefits such as “distributive
impacts . . . and equity” and “the enhancement of health and
safety, the protection of the natural environment, and the
elimination or reduction of discrimination or bias.”47
Even with these changes, not everyone was thrilled with EO
12,866. Some were disappointed that OIRA and cost-benefit
analysis would continue to play a large role in determining
regulatory policy.48 Others had long fretted that little would
change if the culture – and personnel – at OIRA did not change.49
Still others continued to worry about displacement of agency
discretion; they thought that statutes giving authority and
discretion to agencies did not allow the White House to direct the
agencies to make particular decisions on particular matters.50
Nevertheless, it seems fair to say – certainly in retrospect –
that the Clinton years were relatively quiet ones for OIRA review.
The process did not seem to involve the kinds of delays and
secrecy prevalent in the Reagan-Bush years.51 The one known
case of a high-level elevation of an issue to the President –
involving EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
particulate matter and ozone – resulted in a decision allowing the

47. Id. §§ 1(a), 6(a)(e)(C)(i)
48. Including this author: Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the
Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2027-28 (1999).
49. Morrison, supra note 17 at 1067-68; Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of
Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection
Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L.
1, 55-73 (1984).
50. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for
a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997); Peter L. Strauss,
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 967 (1997).
51. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State:
The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 996-98 (2001).
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agency to proceed with the rules.52 While the OIRA process has
never been free from controversy, the Clinton years were
probably the least contentious.53
The period of relative quiet did not last. Upon assuming
office in 2001, President George W. Bush, like his predecessors,
sought to put his own stamp on regulatory policy through the
OIRA process. Interestingly, however, he did not do this by
issuing a significant new executive order. He did issue two
executive orders on regulatory review, but they were (as these
things go) relatively minor. One, EO 13,258, replaced the VicePresident-driven elevation process with a process staffed with the
Another, EO 13,422, strengthened
President’s “advisors.”54
language requiring agencies to find a market failure before
regulating and also directed OIRA to review significant agency
guidance (that is, agency statements of policy or interpretation
that do not have the legal effect of rules).55 EO 13,422 generated
criticism within the health, safety, and environmental community
because of its tilt toward the superiority of private markets and
its assertion of authority to review agency guidance.56 But EO
12,866 also remained in place.
Rather than prescribing a whole new framework for
regulatory review, President Bush chose an intellectually forceful
52. John H. Cushman Jr., Clinton Sharply Tightens Air Pollution
Regulations Despite Concern Over Costs, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 1997), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/26/us/clinton-sharply-tightens-air-pollutionregulations-despite-concern-over-costs.html.
53. See Steinzor, supra note 6 at 245-47 but see Lisa Schultz Bressman &
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the
Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006). Note, however,
that in their important article reporting on the views of the OIRA process from
those inside the EPA during the Bush I and Clinton years, Lisa Schulz
Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh did not find substantial differences in the
responses of EPA personnel to questions about White House involvement in
rulemaking during these different administrations. Id.
54. Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204-206 (2002) (amending Exec. Order
No. 12,866 on Regulatory Planning and Review, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 28,
2002)).
55. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2007) (further amendment to Exec.
Order No. 12,866 on Regulatory Planning and Review, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan.
23, 2007).
56. See, e.g., OMB WATCH, A FAILURE TO GOVERN: BUSH’S ATTACK ON THE
REGULATORY
PROCESS
(2007),
available
at
http://dev.ombwatch.org/files/regs/PDFs/FailuretoGovern.pdf.
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and politically shrewd academic, John Graham, to head OIRA.57
One of Graham’s first acts as OIRA Administrator was to issue a
memorandum on OIRA disclosure to OIRA staff. Acknowledging
that transparency was essential to the legitimacy of the process,58
Graham moved to increase transparency in several ways. He
directed that documents related to OIRA review be made
available online.59 He required that notices of meetings and
other communications with outside parties be made available
online.60 He returned rules to agencies with a written and public
explanation of why they were being returned.61 Each of these
actions increased the public’s access to information about what
happened when rules went to OIRA.
Another of Graham’s innovations, however, turned in the
opposite direction. Graham began to insist that agencies involve
OIRA early on in their deliberative processes.62 This early
intervention ensured that rules would not arrive at OIRA fully
baked, with little for OIRA to do but accept or reject them. It also
meant that many of OIRA’s early efforts would leave no public
trail. The latter point requires a note of explanation. OIRA has
always, so far as I know, taken the position that only when a
regulatory action is sent to OIRA through official channels –
which now include a computer system used for the purpose of
facilitating the transfer of rules between the agencies and OIRA –
do the transparency requirements of EO 12,866 kick in. If an
agency briefs OIRA on a rule prior to formally sending it to OIRA,
or consults with OIRA before doing so, or even sends a full57. A sense of the reaction Dr. Graham’s appointment inspired in
environmental circles can be found in Steve Weinberg, Mr. Bottom Line,
ONEARTH
(Spring
2003),
available
at
http://www.nrdc.org/onearth/03spr/graham1.asp.
58. John D. Graham, OIRA Disclosure Memo-B, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET
(Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_oira_disclosure_memob. (“I believe that the transparency of OIRA's regulatory review process is
critical to our ability to improve the nation's regulatory system. Only if it is clear
how the OMB review process works and what it does will Congress and the
public understand our role and the reasons behind our decisions.”).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See OIRA Return Letters, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
62. John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of
the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 972-74 (2005).
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fledged rule package to OIRA outside formal channels, none of
this, or any of its consequences, will appear in the public record
assembled for formal OIRA review. Thus, Graham’s emphasis on
early, informal intervention had the potential to significantly
undermine the transparency achieved by his initiatives on
disclosure.
One episode from the Bush years, which occurred after
Graham left office, well illustrates OIRA’s power to secretly alter
an agency’s course. Shortly after the Supreme Court held, in
Massachusetts v. EPA,63 that the Clean Air Act empowers EPA to
regulate greenhouse gases, President Bush held a press
conference in the Rose Garden and directed EPA and the
Department of Transportation to develop rules for cars that
would comply with the Court’s decision.64 EPA would, at the
same time, prepare a finding as to whether greenhouse gases
endangered public health or welfare and thus triggered
regulatory obligations under the Clean Air Act.65 The agencies
went quickly to work, and within seven months EPA had
prepared a draft endangerment finding, and the agencies
together had prepared rules to regulate greenhouse gases from
cars. The agencies sent the rules to OIRA for review.66 Then
things went off the rails.
As I have mentioned, OIRA uses a computer system – known
as “ROCIS” – to manage regulatory submissions from agencies.67
When an agency sends an action to OIRA for review, it submits
the package to ROCIS.68 From its end, OIRA then – in theory –
uploads the package from ROCIS. When OIRA uploads the
package, it is accepted for review. At that moment, the clock
starts to tick on OIRA’s review, and the public disclosure
63. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
64. Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2-3.
67. Even for Washington, the name of the system is exceptionally acronymic:
the acronym “ROCIS” contains within it two additional acronyms. “ROCIS”
stands for “RISC” (Regulatory Information Service Center) and OIRA
Consolidated Information System.”
68. OIRA Regulatory System, Records Management System and Records
Management
Center,
OFFICE
OF
MGMT.
&
BUDGET,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/gils_oira-gils (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
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requirements kick in. If OIRA does not upload the package,
however, it is as if it was never sent to OIRA; no clock begins
ticking, and the package does not appear on OIRA’s website
listing rules under review. This is what happened to the draft
endangerment finding and the proposed rules on cars: OIRA
simply declined to upload them into ROCIS. A presidential
promise, months of work, compliance with a Supreme Court
ruling – all went out the window with OIRA’s simple refusal to be
in receiving mode when the agencies sent the package over to
OIRA.69 The endangerment finding and the rules on cars
languished at the agencies until the Obama administration came
into office.
The effect on EPA of OIRA’s declination of this regulatory
package is hard to overstate. EPA had become accustomed,
through sheer necessity, to OIRA’s interventions in the
rulemaking process. But, so far as I know, OIRA had never
before simply declined to accept a fully formed regulatory
package. Over a year later, by the time I arrived at EPA as the
Administrator’s climate advisor, agency personnel were still
reeling from OIRA’s action. During my time at EPA, when OIRA
would delay uploading a package to ROCIS for any reason, worry
would spread through the offices involved with the package that
perhaps OIRA would – as it had with the endangerment finding
and the cars rules – just not upload the documents, and it would
be as if they had never been sent, or indeed as if they had never
been written.
The refusal to open the documents on endangerment and cars
caused a furor in the environmental community once it became
known.70 It emerged as a primary example of how OIRA should

69. Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open Pollutants E-Mail, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
25,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/washington/25epa.html?_r=0;
Juliet
Eilperin & R. Jeffrey Smith, EPA Won’t Act on Emissions This Year; Instead of
New Rules, More Comment Sought, WASH. POST (July 11, 2008),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-07-11/news/36823556_1_greenhousegas-clean-air-act-human-health-and-welfare. As Eilperin and Smith report, it
was not clear exactly who within the White House ordered that the regulatory
package be declined. Id.
70. Here is Jon Stewart’s hilarious take on the episode, The Daily Show with
Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast June 25, 2008), available at:
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not operate.71 To critics, the incident bespoke disrespect for
agency process and even for the rule of law. Many hoped such a
thing would not happen again.
The assertiveness and opacity of OIRA during the George W.
Bush administration led many to hope that when Barack Obama
came into office, things would change for the better. And indeed,
one of President Obama’s first acts was to issue an executive
order revoking the Bush-era executive orders on regulatory
review.72 As noted, the major substantive innovation of these
orders was the assertion of OIRA authority to review agency
guidance; thus, one of the major effects of the revocation of the
Bush-era orders should have been to keep OIRA from reviewing
agency guidance.
But this was not to be. In a little-noticed memorandum
issued less than two months later, OIRA Director Peter Orszag
essentially revoked President Obama’s revocation of the executive
order on guidance.73 Orszag announced that OIRA would, despite
Obama’s order, continue to review agency guidance, since it had
done so for many years.74 The President’s revocation of the Bushera executive orders had received enthusiastic attention from
progressive groups.75
Perhaps not surprisingly, the OMB
Director’s memorandum revoking the major substantive part of

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-june-25-2008/be-patient-this-getsamazing---epa-e-mail
71. White House Disses Supreme Court, Kills $2 Trillion Savings,
CLIMATEPROGRESS,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2008/07/01/202838/whitehouse-mocks-supreme-court-kills-2-trillion-savings/ (July 1, 2008) (also
discussing OMB intervention in EPA’s later-issued Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking regarding greenhouse gases).
72. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. § 218 (2009) (revoking Executive Orders
13,258 and 13,422 concerning Regulatory Planning and Review).
73. Memorandum from Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget Peter R. Orszag
for the Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Obama Begins Regulatory Reform, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T,
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/9689 (Feb. 10, 2009); James Goodwin,
Revoking EO 13422: An Important First Step Toward Fixing the Regulatory
System,
CTR.
FOR
PROGRESSIVE
REFORM
(Feb.
4,
2009),
http://www.progressivereform.org/printPage.cfm?idBlog=417B6671-1E0B-E803CA4ED11FA8E0030C.
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the President’s executive order – issued quietly, without a press
release – received almost no attention.76 In fact, so stealthy was
the replacement of Obama’s order with Orszag’s memorandum
that, even months later, I found myself having to explain to EPA
personnel why they still needed to send agency guidance to OIRA
for review. Quite understandably, they had read Barack Obama’s
executive order rather than Peter Orszag’s interoffice
memorandum.
In another gesture of potential change, in January 2009
President Obama also issued a presidential memorandum
directing the Director of OMB to consult with representatives of
regulatory agencies and to make recommendations to the
President for a new executive order on regulatory review.77 The
memorandum noted that much had been learned since 1993,
when EO 12,866 was issued, about both the substance of
regulation (“what works and what does not”) and about “how to
improve the process of regulatory review.”78 “In this time of
fundamental transformation,” President Obama declared, “that
process – and the principles governing regulation in general –
should be revisited.”79 The President also laid out specific topics
he wanted covered in OMB’s recommendations:
[T]he recommendations should offer suggestions for the
relationship between OIRA and the agencies; provide guidance
on disclosure and transparency; encourage public participation in
agency regulatory processes; offer suggestions on the role of costbenefit analysis; address the role of distributional considerations,
fairness, and concern for the interests of future generations;
identify methods of ensuring that regulatory review does not
produce undue delay; clarify the role of the behavioral sciences in

76. No press statement appears on the White House website devoted to such
items: Statements and Releases, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/Statements-and-Releases/2009/03 (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
77. Presidential Memorandum of January 30, 2009: Regulatory Review, 74
Fed. Reg. 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO
/fedRegReview/POTUS_Memo_on_Regulatory_Review.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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formulating regulatory policy; and identify the best tools for
achieving public goals through the regulatory process. 80

President Obama directed OMB to produce the
recommendations within 100 days.81 The President also directed
OMB to consult with the representatives of regulatory agencies,
“as appropriate,” in formulating recommendations for a new
executive order.82 From my time at EPA, I know that agencies
did indeed submit comments to OMB. Notably, OMB never made
the agencies’ comments public; thus we do not know what the
agencies said to OMB about regulatory review and how to
improve the process. OMB also asked the public for comments on
regulatory review and how to reform it.83 Public comments (183
of them)84 came in by the end of March 2009.85
And there the matter sat. Agency personnel, buoyed by the
possibility of reform of a secretive, intrusive, and time-consuming
process, eagerly anticipated the new executive order. Outside
groups interested in health, safety, and environmental protection
cheered the prospect of changes to a system that had worked
disproportionately against rules in their domain. But nothing
happened for almost two years, and, in that time, OIRA
continued to assert its customary control over agency regulatory
decisions.
C. Executive Order 13,563
In January 2011, a new executive order on regulatory review
finally emerged.86 The single most notable fact about the new
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Federal Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (Feb. 26, 2009) (inviting
public comment on how to improve the process of regulatory review and
principles governing regulation).
84. Steinzor, supra note 6 at 255-56.
85. Federal Regulatory Review, Extension of request for comments, 74 Fed.
Reg. 11,383 (Mar. 17, 2009) (extending public comment period to March 31,
2009). A summary of the comments from 170 different individuals and
organizations can be found at: Comments on New Regulatory Order Pour into
OMB, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/9913 (last
visited Oct. 10, 2013).
86. Exec. Order. No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/5

16

HEINZERLING - FINAL- NUMBERED

2014]

3/26/2014 11:23 AM

INSIDE EPA

341

order, EO 13,563, is how not-new it was; much of the order simply
repeats, verbatim, the language of EO 12,866.
Another striking fact about the order is how weakly
responsive it is to President Obama’s own directives in his
presidential memorandum of January 2009: EO 13,563 does not
say a word about “the relationship between OIRA and the
agencies” or “methods of ensuring that regulatory review does not
produce undue delay.” On “disclosure and transparency,” the
order says nothing about disclosure and transparency related to
OIRA, but focuses only on the agencies and here simply advises
them to place materials online and in an open format wherever
On “public participation in agency regulatory
possible.87
processes,” the order advises the agencies to seek out the public’s
views prior to proposing rules (something agencies already
routinely did).88 On “the role of cost-benefit analysis,” the order
adds nothing to EO 12,866 except for a new allowance for “human
dignity” in the calculations of regulatory benefits.89 As for “the
role of distributional considerations, fairness, and concern for the
interests of future generations,” the order adds only the word
“fairness” to EO 12,866’s already-existing references to
distributive impacts and equity.90 And as for clarifying “the role
of the behavioral sciences in formulating regulatory policy” and
identifying “the best tools for achieving public goals through the
regulatory process,” the only new item in the new executive order
was a reference to “appropriate default rules.”91
President Obama’s new executive order on regulatory review,
in short, was neither very new nor very specific. Any hope that
President Obama would use the new executive order as an
occasion to fundamentally reshape the relationship between the
White House and the agencies, or to loosen the grip of cost-benefit
analysis on regulatory policy, was dashed.
Yet the very
vagueness of the executive order also created a large space within
which OIRA could fashion a kind of common law of regulatory
review. OIRA eagerly inhabited that space.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 213 (2011).
Id. § 2(c).
Id. § 1(c).
Id.
Id. § 4.
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II. THE COMMON LAW OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER 13,563
The common law of EO 13,563 determines the most
important features of the current process of regulatory review:
who is the decision maker, what is reviewed, why particular
actions fail regulatory review, when actions emerge from review,
and what is disclosed about the process. If one has read EOs
12,866 and 13,563, which in theory govern this process, surprises
are in store once we look at the way the process actually operates.
A. Who Decides?
Recall that EO 12,866 puts OIRA initially in charge of the
process of regulatory review. But if, according to EO 12,866, a
dispute arises between OIRA and the action agency, the dispute
is to be resolved through a highly specified process that involves
recommendations from the Vice-President and an ultimate
decision by the President or by the Vice-President acting on his
behalf.92
This is not how regulatory review works today. In my two
years at EPA, I do not recall ever hearing of Vice-Presidential
involvement in a regulatory matter. Moreover, the OIRA process
in the Obama administration was not structured to funnel
disputes between OIRA and the agencies to Vice-President Biden
for his recommendations. It was far messier and more ill-defined
than that. From my perspective, it was often hard to tell who
exactly was in charge of making the ultimate decision on an
important regulatory matter.
A recent account of the OIRA process by former OIRA
Administrator Cass Sunstein helps to explain this confusion as to
some regulatory matters, but leaves a puzzle as to others.93
Sunstein states that OIRA’s primary role in the regulatory
process is as an “information-aggregator” – compiling information
from many actors in the executive branch and using that
92. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 7, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). Recall that the Bushera executive order replacing the role of the Vice-President with that of
presidential “advisors” was revoked by President Obama during his first days in
office. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. § 218 (2009).
93. See Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5.
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information to help get at the right regulatory result.94
Observing that the White House is a “they,” not an “it,”95
Sunstein emphasizes the role of other White House offices and
officials, beyond OIRA, in shaping regulatory policy.96 Sunstein
lists almost a dozen White House offices that, he says, play a
significant role.97 Beyond the White House, Sunstein asserts that
agencies other than the agency proposing a particular regulatory
action also have a large influence on regulatory policy.98
Sometimes it is another Cabinet secretary who might have such
influence;99 often, Sunstein says, it is career staff at another
agency.100 Sometimes it is the Chief of Staff of the White House
who plays the major role;101 sometimes it is a member of
Congress.102 Sunstein extols the virtues of this system, arguing
that the aggregation of input from all of these different sources
produces better regulatory results.103 Of course, Sunstein’s
description also explains why it was often hard, from EPA’s
perspective, to know who was calling the shots; perhaps it was
Rahm Emanuel, the White House Chief of Staff from 2009 to
2010, or perhaps it was Tom Vilsack, the Secretary of
Agriculture, or perhaps it was a career staffer at the Department
of Energy. The confusion was deepened by OIRA’s insistence
that, once a matter was under review, all communications run
through OIRA.104 At one point in my tenure at EPA, it was even
suggested that a conversation between members of the
President’s Cabinet on a matter under review would be
inappropriate if OIRA were not included.
Sunstein’s account of the OIRA process at least helps me to
understand why we were all so confused about exactly what the
process was.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1838, 1840, 1844, 1875.
Id. at 1840, 1854, 1858.
Id. at 1845, 1849, 1854, 1856, 1857, 1865, 1870-71.
Id. at 1855.
Id. at 1840-43, 1847, 1854, 1869.
See Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1851-52, 1858.
Id. at 1941-43.
Id. at 1856, 1871.
Id. at 1852, 1858.
Id. at 1840-41, 1843, 1869-72.
Id. at 1859.
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In another respect, though, Sunstein’s account in the
Harvard Law Review is puzzling rather than clarifying. From my
vantage point at EPA, it certainly often appeared that OIRA – not
other White House offices, not other agencies – was calling the
shots. OIRA decided what to review, offered line-by-line edits of
regulatory proposals, convened meetings with outside parties,
mediated disputes among the agencies, decided whether an
agency’s cost-benefit analysis was up to snuff, and more. It often
appeared, from the agency’s perspective, that other White House
offices were brought in to bolster, not to question, OIRA’s position
on regulatory matters.105 I was not in the White House, and so I
cannot confirm that the latter impression was correct. But I can
say that Sunstein’s account does not jibe with my own
perceptions of OIRA’s power relative to EPA or to other executive
branch actors.
In his new book on his time in the government, however,
Sunstein paints a somewhat different picture of the role of OIRA
during his tenure. Sunstein’s book, “Simpler: The Future of
Government,” makes clear just how much power he wielded as
the Administrator of OIRA. Referring to OIRA as “the cockpit of
the regulatory state,”106 Sunstein informs us that, as OIRA
Administrator, he had the power to “say no to members of the
president’s Cabinet”;107 to deposit “highly touted rules, beloved by
regulators, onto the shit list”;108 to make sure that some rules
“never saw the light of day”;109 to impose cost-benefit analysis
“wherever the law allowed”;110 and to transform cost-benefit
analysis from an analytical tool into a “rule of decision,” meaning
that “[a]gencies could not go forward” if their rules flunked
OIRA’s cost-benefit test.111 This account – in which OIRA plays a
central and often decisive role in determining which rules move
and which don’t – is much more consistent with my own
105. This impression is consistent with EPA officials’ accounts of White House
involvement in rulemaking during the Bush I and Clinton years. Bressman &
Vandenbergh, supra note 53, at 68-69.
106. See SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 5, at 3.
107. See id. at 3.
108. See id. at 6.
109. See id at 7.
110. See id. at 8.
111. See id. at 161.
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experience at EPA than is Sunstein’s account of OIRA as a kind
of neutral “information-aggregator.”112
Beyond Sunstein’s account, the relative power of EPA within
the OIRA process is also well illustrated by considering the
increase in influence that EPA personnel enjoy when they go on
detail to offices within the White House. Many White House
offices depend on agency detailees to help do their work. The
Council of Economic Advisors and the Council on Environmental
Quality nearly always have one or more detailees from EPA.
These detailees, in my experience, participate actively in the
OIRA process – and, often, not by pressing for EPA’s rules but
instead by offering critiques of EPA’s work. The detailees appear
to have far more power when they are housed in a White House
office than they do at EPA, often because their expertise –
frequently it is economics – is more central to the White House
process than it is to EPA’s regulatory frameworks. Going on
detail to the White House increases the power of EPA personnel
not because they somehow become more expert when they go to
the White House, but because the White House privileges their
particular expertise over other kinds of expertise. Going on detail
to the White House also increases the power of agency personnel
for another, very simple reason: the White House has the final
say on agency rules.
The role of agency detailees in the OIRA process makes it
hard to make sense of Sunstein’s portrait of OIRA as an
“information-aggregator.” If, as I have said, an appreciable
number of the people doing the work in the White House are
actually employees on detail from the agencies whose work is
being reviewed, what sense does it make to say that the OIRA
review process increases the total amount of information
gathered during a rulemaking process or that it increases the
likelihood that a rule will get it right? The same agency
personnel participating in the White House process have virtually
identical counterparts, making the same kinds of observations, in
their home agencies; yet these personnel have a power in the
White House that they do not enjoy in their home agencies. More
than an information-aggregator, then, OIRA is an information-

112. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1838.
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sorter; economic information rises to the top, other information
shakes out below.
Also relevant to the question of who is calling the shots in the
OIRA process is the kind of rules OIRA reviews. Most of the
rules OIRA reviews are not economically significant;113 that is,
they do not pass EO 12,866’s economic-significance threshold of
$100 million in annual costs.114 Many of the rules do not have
obvious interagency dimensions. Many are continuing iterations
of longstanding regulatory programs. In these cases, when the
rules got into trouble in the OIRA process, it often did not appear
that there was any appreciable interagency pushback on the rules
or any White House resistance outside OIRA. Often, indeed, it
appeared that OIRA career staff simply trumped EPA career staff
when it came to rules that were neither insignificant enough,
from OIRA’s perspective, to pass up the opportunity for review,
nor significant enough, from EPA’s perspective, to elevate the
issue beyond OIRA.115
In these ways, the “common law” of regulatory review under
President Obama manages to muddy the seemingly simple
question: who runs EPA? Long gone, it appears, is the carefully
articulated power structure of EO 12,866, with its process for
elevating issues and for deciding them once elevated. In its place,
a free-for-all of regulatory power has emerged, with no one clearly
in charge. The lack of a clear power structure is, perhaps
unintentionally, best captured by Sunstein’s incongruent
accounts of his own role in the process: was he the regulatory
czar, or an information-aggregator? It depends on which account
you read.

113. From January 20, 2009, to April 8, 2013, OIRA reviewed a total of 2514
regulatory actions, of which only 477 were economically significant. Review
Counts, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eoCountsSearch (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). For EPA, the numbers
were 340 total rules, 66 of which were economically significant. Id.
114. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
115. For a similar account of the Bush I and Clinton years, see Bressman &
Vandenbergh, supra note 53.
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B. What Is Reviewed?
One domain in which OIRA’s powerful role is quite clear,
however, is in the decisions about which regulatory actions OIRA
will review. EO 12,866 states that OIRA may review not only
economically significant actions, but also actions with a
significant potential for interagency conflict or inconsistency and
actions that raise “novel legal or policy issues.”116 In fact, most of
the rules OIRA reviews are not economically significant. In the
Obama administration so far, some 80 percent of the EPA rules
that have been reviewed were not economically significant.117
Moreover, many of the rules under review lack any obvious
interagency dimension. So how does OIRA come to review them?
While I was at EPA, we had a routinized process for
determining what went to OIRA. Every three months or so, the
Assistant Administrators of the program offices (air, water, solid
waste and emergency response, chemical safety and pollution
prevention) and I met with representatives from OIRA to go over
the regulatory actions EPA planned to announce in the coming
months. We offered our own opinion as to whether any given
item warranted OIRA review. But the bottom line was that it
was not our decision to make. If OIRA wanted to review
something, OIRA reviewed it.118 Sometimes, the reason for
review was a little baffling, along the lines of: we’ve always
reviewed this kind of action, so we’d like to review this one, too.
The explanation was baffling because the longstanding practice of
review sometimes came straight from a prior administration with
seemingly different perspectives on the role of regulation and
government; the same OIRA career personnel who had “always”
reviewed those kinds of actions were insisting that they should
still review them, even after a change in personnel at the very top
– and even though, strangely, they were often asserting such
power of review under the EO provision that covered “novel” legal
or policy issues.119 On occasion, EPA was able to persuade OIRA
116. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(4), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
117. Numbers are available from the OIRA website. Executive Order Review
Counts Results, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eoCountsSearch (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
118. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(2)(B), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
119. Id. § 3(f)(4).
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not to review a regulatory action that OIRA was inclined to
review; but this was the exception, not the rule.
It is thus quite perplexing to read recent accounts of the
OIRA process that argue that agencies can avoid OIRA review
altogether through quite obvious and simple stratagems.120
Agencies can, it is argued, separate regulatory actions into
different packages so that no one action is economically
significant;121 they can low-ball their estimates of regulatory
costs to come in under the threshold for economic significance;122
they can slip a policy out as guidance rather than as a rule;123
they can do low-quality cost-benefit analysis to make OIRA
review more difficult;124 they can even, we are told, spring a rule
on the world without warning to OIRA.125
From the perspective of EPA, at least, this is not a plausible
account.
Most of the EPA rules OIRA reviews are not
economically significant, so fussing around to make a rule or
package of rules not economically significant won’t help to avoid
OIRA review. OIRA, in any event, lavishes skeptical attention on
EPA’s estimates of regulatory costs. Moreover, as discussed
above, OIRA continues to review agency guidance,126 so
denominating an action as guidance will not avoid OIRA review.
And in my experience, OIRA personnel keep an eagle eye on EPA
– on its public announcements, website, etc. – to make sure EPA
does not sneak something past it. From OIRA’s perspective, the
system appears to work: EPA receives more sustained attention
from OIRA than any other federal agency. Most often, EPA is the
agency with the largest number of rules under review at OIRA.127
120. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994 (2011).
121. Nou, supra note 120 at 36.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 28-32.
124. Id. at 37-40.
125. OIRA Avoidance, supra note 120, at 1005.
126. See Memorandum from Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget Peter R.
Orszag for the Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 4,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf.
127. Lists of rules under formal review at OIRA can be found online. OFFICE
OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov (last visited Oct. 22
2013).
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On the issue of which regulatory actions go to OIRA,
therefore, the express terms of EO 12,866 again recede and a
common law emerges. OIRA reviews pretty much anything it
wants to review and fits anything it must into the catch-all
category, “novel legal or policy issues.”
C. Why Do Rules Fail?
One of the most vexing questions concerning regulatory
review has to do with the basis on which regulatory actions fail
this review. When a regulatory action goes to OIRA for review, it
goes fully formed, reflecting the agency’s best judgment about the
proper path in the relevant circumstances. EPA rules go to OIRA
after an extensive period of internal development and review.128
In many cases, the rules have been under development for years,
with dozens or more agency personnel working on them. In the
case of the most significant rules, they have gone to the
Administrator herself for initial selection of options and later for
final review.129 It is a matter of some consequence, then, when
OIRA does not allow such rules to issue, or requires substantial
changes before they may issue.
One reason why OIRA might disapprove of an agency’s
planned action is that it disagrees with the agency’s
interpretation of the statute the agency is charged with
administering. Notably, neither EO 12,866 nor EO 13,563 gives
OIRA the authority to second-guess agencies’ interpretations of
the statutes they administer. Indeed, both executive orders
explicitly state that nothing in them permits a departure from

128. EPA has a robust internal process for developing rules. EPA OFFICE OF
POLICY, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: GUIDANCE FOR EPA STAFF ON
DEVELOPING QUALITY ACTIONS (2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/
sabproduct.nsf/5088B3878A90053E8525788E005EC8D8/$File/adp03-00-11.pdf.
129. EPA’s Action Development Process specifies the criteria for determining
which regulatory actions are “Tier 1” rules and thus must receive substantial
input from the Administrator at important stages in the rulemaking process.
EPA, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS GUIDANCE FOR EPA STAFF ON
DEVELOPING QUALITY ACTIONS 22-27 (2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/
sab/sabproduct.nsf/5088B3878A90053E8525788E005EC8D8/$File/adp03-0011.pdf.
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existing law.130 Yet, in a post-Chevron world, that disclaimer
means less than it seems.131 If a statute is ambiguous – or if
OIRA believes that a statute is ambiguous – then perhaps OIRA
has room to press an agency to change its interpretation of a
statute it administers, without running afoul of the EOs’
injunction to follow existing law. After Chevron, “existing law” is
up for grabs so long as existing law is ambiguous.
President Obama’s OIRA has aggressively moved into the
space created by Chevron. As a law professor, Cass Sunstein had
promoted “cost-benefit default principles,” according to which
statutes are interpreted to allow cost-benefit analysis so long as
they do not clearly forbid it;132 as OIRA Administrator, Sunstein
moved to lock these default principles into place.133 With respect
to EPA rules, OIRA actively pressed EPA to interpret its
governing statutes to allow cost-benefit analysis, even where EPA
had a long history of interpreting them not to allow it. Pressure
like this appears to have borne public fruit when EPA announced
its long-awaited proposal for addressing the ecological impacts of
cooling water intake structures under the Clean Water Act.134 In
its preamble discussing the rule, EPA noted that it was adopting
an interpretation of the relevant provision of the Clean Water Act
that would allow cost-benefit analysis, citing EO 13,563 as
authority for this interpretation.135
I have argued elsewhere that agencies should not get
deference under Chevron when an interpretation is foist upon
them by OIRA; OIRA is not charged by Congress with
interpreting the statutes the agencies administer, and OIRA does

130. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 9, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563
§ 7(b)(i), (c), 3 C.F.R. § 213 (2011).
131. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
132. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651
(2001).
133. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 5, at 8 .
134. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System – Cooling Water Intake
Structures at Existing Facilities and Phase I Facilities, Proposed Rule, 76 Fed.
Reg. 22173, 22185, 22196, 22207, 22212 (Apr. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 122 and 125).
135. Id.
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not have the expertise of the relevant agencies.136 But whatever
one thinks about the legal consequences of an OIRA-driven
agency interpretation, one must take note of the large degree of
influence wielded by OIRA when one of the powers it asserts is to
embed cost-benefit default principles into the regulatory process.
To understand the boldness of OIRA’s power grab, it helps to
consider a bit of history. In 1994, eyeing the first Republican
takeover of the House of Representatives in forty years, Newt
Gingrich proposed an aggressive series of legislative reforms,
bundled together as the “Contract With America.”137 Among the
most contentious of the proposals was the “supermandate”: a
requirement that all rules protecting human health, safety, or the
environment pass a cost-benefit test.138 Critics of what President
Bill Clinton dubbed the “Contract On America”139 feared that
applying a cost-benefit test to health, safety, and environmental
rules would often spell their doom, as these rules produce benefits
— in human health, in longer life, in cleaner air and water and
land — that are hard to quantify and even harder to monetize.140
President Clinton vetoed bills to fund the government in part
because they contained the supermandate,141 leading to the
government shutdowns of 1995 and likely contributing to
Clinton’s political renewal.
Thanks to Sunstein, though, the supermandate is back. By
pressing agencies to adopt cost-benefit analysis as a decisionmaking framework wherever the law allows it, Sunstein’s OIRA
has, by executive fiat rather than legislative enactment, imposed
a cost-benefit supermandate wherever the law is ambiguous
(which, of course, it often is). Presumably, then, one way that
136. Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2006).
137. See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, The 1994 Campaign: The Republicans;
With Fiery Words, Gingrich Builds His Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at
A1.
138. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The APA at Fifty: The Expanded Debate
Over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1494 (1996).
139. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, The Clinton Record: Congress; The President and
Congress: A Partnership of Self-Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at A1.
140. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Says G.O.P. Rule Cutting Would Cost
Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A14.
141. See, e.g., R.W. Apple Jr., Battle Over the Budget: News Analysis; In This
Fight, Polls Guide All the Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at A1.
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rules can fail the OIRA process is if they do not hew to OIRA’s
new supermandate.
Another way rules can fail the OIRA review process is to fail
cost-benefit analysis. One way to fail is never to try. An
important but little-remarked aspect of the relationship between
EPA and OIRA is that OIRA’s fine cost-benefit sieve leads EPA
personnel to be deeply wary of developing rules that have very
high costs in relation to their quantified and monetized benefits.
Indeed, Sunstein himself suggests this may be one consequence of
OIRA’s cost-benefit test.142 From the moment EPA begins even
to think about proposing a rule that OIRA will likely want to see,
EPA personnel wonder whether OIRA will accept it; this mindset
narrows the range of rules EPA might otherwise consider.
If EPA does decide to propose a rule that has much higher
costs than benefits, that rule may not make it past OIRA. Among
environmental rules, non-air rules fare the worst in a cost-benefit
framework.
Rules governing air pollution often produce
relatively (or even very) high benefits in relation to costs on
account of reductions in particulate matter. Indeed, according to
OMB, in the last decade clean air rules have produced a majority
of the total monetized benefits conferred by all of the major
regulations in the federal government.143
Rules on water
pollution, toxics, and hazardous waste contamination do not have
a single category of benefits – like reductions in human mortality
due to reductions in particulate matter – that makes it possible
for them to clear the cost-benefit hurdle. These programs fare
poorly in OIRA’s process of review. EPA’s proposal to regulate
coal ash changed markedly while at OIRA, and has not seen the
light of day since it was proposed.144 EPA initiatives on toxics
have stalled at OIRA for years.145 Likewise, rules on water
142. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1863.
143. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE,
LOCAL,
AND
TRIBAL
ENTITIES,
15
(2012),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/draft_2012_cost_benefit_r
eport.pdf.
144. White House Misadventures in Coal Ash Rule, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T
(May 18, 2010), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11001.
145. See Executive Order Submissions Under Review, OFFICE OF INFO. &
REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
(Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
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pollution appear permanently stuck.146 While Sunstein reports
that cost-benefit analysis is not a major reason why rules get
stuck at OIRA,147 it is hard to escape speculating that cost-benefit
analysis must be one factor in the trouble these categories of
rules have run into at OIRA. Indeed, Sunstein also says that
rules that fail cost-benefit will in fact likely fail OIRA review. 148
Sunstein asserts that EO 13,563 adds qualitative texture to
the generally quantitative thrust of cost-benefit analysis.149 In
particular, he notes, EO 13,563 introduced “dignity” into the costbenefit equation.150 Sunstein cites the Department of Justice’s
rule on prison rape as an instance in which “dignity” made a
difference in the regulatory process.151 In its cost-benefit analysis
of its rule aiming to reduce the incidence of prison rape, DOJ
noted that it was very hard to quantify and monetize the benefits
of reducing rape.152 Nevertheless, DOJ said, reducing rape would
promote human dignity, and this was a positive feature of its rule
on prison rape.153
But I would venture to guess that the only reason DOJ was
doing a cost-benefit analysis of rape prevention was that OIRA
insisted on it. The only reason DOJ needed to reach to justify
preventing rape was that OIRA’s cost-benefit vision did not easily
digest, in economic terms, a human indignity like rape.154 To
argue, as Sunstein does, that the inclusion of “dignity” in EO
13,563 somehow made it possible to issue DOJ’s rule on prison
rape is to get things very backwards.

eoReviewSearch (showing chemicals rules that have been at OIRA for one to
three years).
146. See id. (showing water rules that have been at OIRA for over a year).
147. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1868-69.
148. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 5, at 161.
149. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1865.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT, REGULATORY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINAL RULE 3 (2012), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_ria.pdf.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit Jumps the Shark, GEO. L. FACULTY BLOG
(June 13, 2012), http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law/2012/06/
cost-benefit-jumps-the-shark.html.
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One of the most problematic features of cost-benefit analysis,
especially for future-oriented regulatory programs like those
involving the environment, is its treatment of future
consequences. In calling for recommendations on a new executive
order, President Obama explicitly asked the OMB Director to
address “concern for the interests of future generations.”155 This
concern did not make it into the actual executive order, and
indeed, the record of the Obama administration has been
disappointing in this domain. The Obama administration’s
signature effort in this area – the estimation of the “social cost of
carbon”156 – used higher discount rates than OIRA’s own costbenefit guidance to agencies allows when a regulatory policy has
significant intergenerational effects. The Obama administration
approved a “central” value for the discount rate to be used in
calculating the social cost of carbon of 3 percent and a upper
value of 5 percent157 – yet OIRA’s own guidance allows agencies
to use discount rates of 1 to 3 percent where intergenerational
effects are significant.158 Increasing the discount rate means
decreasing the worth of future generations.159 In approving a
high range of discount rates for climate consequences, the Obama
administration took a step backward, not forward, in the
incorporation of future generations’ interests in cost-benefit
analysis.
We have seen that rules might fail OIRA review because they
do not have a positive enough cost-benefit profile, and that
President Obama’s executive order on regulatory review has not
appreciably helped rules get over this hurdle. Another reason
why rules might fail OIRA review is that they simply fail “on the
merits.” This is, in fact, Sunstein’s explanation of why EPA’s
155. Presidential Memorandum of January 30, 2009, Regulatory Review, 74
Fed. Reg. 21, 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-regulatory-review.
156. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COSTS OF CARBON, TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/
oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf.
157. Id. at 3.
158. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/.
159. See Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV.
39 (1999).
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final rule revising the ozone standard failed: the decision to
return the rule to EPA was, Sunstein asserts, “unquestionably
correct”160 and “made on the merits.”161 He does not explain
what this means – on the merits, considering cost-benefit
analysis? on the merits, considering the scientific evidence? on
the merits, considering EPA’s other priorities and activities? –
but he does insist that the rejection of EPA’s rule on ozone was
“not motivated by politics.”162
Whatever view Sunstein takes of the “merits” of the ozone
rule, it is hard to understand why the President rejected it and
why Sunstein thinks that decision was “unquestionably correct.”
If, by the “merits,” Sunstein means that the rule failed a costbenefit test, that claim would be legally irrelevant. Neither EPA
nor the White House was allowed to use cost-benefit analysis to
pass judgment on the rule: the Supreme Court has held
(unanimously) that EPA may not consider costs in setting the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards.163 The President’s
letter to Administrator Jackson emphasized “regulatory burdens,”
“regulatory uncertainty,” and the economic downturn in
explaining the return of the rule to EPA;164 if these
considerations were indeed the basis for the President’s decision,
the decision was unlawful.
Perhaps Sunstein means that the ozone rule failed on the
scientific merits. Certainly, OIRA has played an active role in
adjusting EPA’s discussions of technical matters in its NAAQS
decisions. In a report prepared for the Administrative Conference
of the United States, Professor Wendy Wagner has carefully
documented just how often OIRA intrudes upon EPA’s technical

160. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 5, at 7.
161. Id. at 27.
162. Id. For a very different take on this episode, see John M. Broder, Reelection Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on Smog, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011).
163. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
164. Press Release, Statement by the President on the Ozone National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Statement by the
President on Ozone], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/02/
statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-qualitystandards.
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analysis in the domain of the NAAQS.165 But OIRA does not
have the scientific expertise necessary to make judgments about
where the NAAQS should be set. Nor, it should be added, does
the President. Moreover, the scientific shakiness of the decision
to direct EPA to withdraw the ozone standard emerged clearly at
oral argument on the EPA standard left in place by President
Obama’s decision. At argument, the panel of D.C. Circuit judges
sharply questioned the government’s lawyers as to the scientific
merits of the Bush-era ozone standard, left standing after EPA
withdrew its revised standard.166 They seemed very skeptical
that the Bush-era standard was stringent enough.167 Given the
lack of relevant expertise on the part of OIRA and the President,
and given the hard time EPA had defending the Bush-era
standard in court, it is hard to imagine that when Sunstein says
Obama’s decision to reject EPA’s revised standard was correct “on
the merits,” Sunstein means that the directive to withdraw the
revised standard was “unquestionably correct” as a matter of
science.
A final possibility is that Sunstein believes that the ozone
decision was correct on the merits because it reflected good
governance. The President’s letter to Administrator Jackson
emphasized the importance of regulatory certainty and observed
that EPA was already in the process of reviewing the ozone
standard in light of the very latest scientific evidence.168 So
perhaps Sunstein means that the decision to reject the standard
was correct because EPA should just have waited for the new
five-year review of the ozone standard, rather than reconsidering
the Bush-era standard and replacing it with a revised standard
based on the same evidence EPA had considered in the Bush
administration.
165. Wendy Wagner, Science in Regulation: A Study of Agency Decisionmaking
Approaches (Feb. 18, 2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf.
166. See Robin Bravender, Obama Ozone Decision Blindsides Enviros – and
His
Own
EPA,
POLITICO,
(Sept.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.politico.com/news/ stories/0911/62586.html.
167. See Lawrence Hurley, Court Sympathetic to Enviros’ Challenge to Bushera Ozone Standards, GREENWIRE (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://eenews.net/
public/Greenwire/2012/11/16/2. However, the court went on to uphold the Bushera standard, in Mississippi v. EPA, 723 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
168. See Statement by the President on Ozone, supra note 164.
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The trouble with this potential explanation is that, by the
time President Obama ordered the standard pulled, EPA had
been working on the reconsidered ozone standard for 2-1/2 years,
with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the White House.
Work on the reconsidered standard was consistent with Rahm
Emanuel’s memorandum to agencies, written within a week of
President Obama’s inauguration, directing them to review new
and pending regulatory actions begun in the Bush
administration, 169 and with the President’s own March 2009
memorandum on scientific integrity.170 The Bush-era ozone
standard was widely regarded as one of the biggest
environmental defaults of the Bush administration relating to the
environment; many thought the standard of 0.075 parts per
million was scientifically unsound. Thus, in September 2009,
EPA announced that it would reconsider the Bush-era ozone
standard.171 In January 2010, EPA proposed revising that
standard.172 EPA held three public hearings and took public
comment on the proposed standard in 2010.173 The proposal went
through OIRA.174 The upper end of the range the agency
proposed to consider was 0.070 parts per million of ozone.175 In
other words, no part of the range EPA proposed for the revision
encompassed the Bush-era standard.
169. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938,
2943 (Jan. 19, 2010); Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009).
170. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938,
2943 (Jan. 19, 2010); Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies
on
Scientific
Integrity
(Mar.
9,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-heads-executivedepartments-and-agencies-3-9-09.
171. Fact Sheet: EPA to Reconsider Ozone Pollution Standards, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/glo/pdfs/O3_Reconsideration_FACT%20SHEET_091609.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
172. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938
(Jan. 19, 2010).
173. EPA, Regulatory Actions: Ozone Standards, http://www.epa.gov/glo/
actions.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2013).
174. Executive Order Reviews Completed Between Jan 1, 2010 to Dec. 31, 2010,
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoHistReviewSearch (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (proposed rule went to OIRA on
Oct. 21, 2009, and review was completed on Jan. 6, 2010).
175. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938,
2997 (Jan. 19, 2010).
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It would be bizarre to say that stopping a decision that
everyone knew about, 2-1/2 years into the process, was justified
on the ground that stopping it was a good way to govern. It was
the opposite: it was a bad way to govern. It wasted tremendous
agency resources and valuable time; it put the agency back at
square one in figuring out how to manage the ozone problem
under the Bush-era standard; it sent a wave of distrust and
disbelief through agency ranks and outside supporters of the
agency; and it put the government in the difficult position of
defending the Bush-era standard left in place. Unleashing chaos
cannot be what Sunstein means when he says that the ozone
decision was correct “on the merits”; but that was the decision’s
effect.
Under the common law of 13,563, then, rules can fail for a
variety of reasons: they can reflect an OIRA-disapproved
understanding of the role of cost-benefit analysis under the
relevant laws; they can fail a cost-benefit test; or they can be bad
ideas on some unspecified theory of the “merits.” Perhaps these
are some of the reasons so many EPA rules seem permanently
stuck at OIRA, as I next discuss.
D. When Does Review End (and Begin)?
The common law of 13,563 also determines the timelines
under which OIRA operates. As discussed above, EO 13,563
explicitly reaffirms EO 12,866, which is the executive order that
sets forth timelines for OIRA review: 10 days for pre-rule actions,
45 days for final rules on subjects already reviewed and little
changed, 90 days for everything else.176 EO 12,866 also, as I have
said, seems clearly to contemplate one 30-day extension if the
OMB Director and the agency head agree to it.177
This is not the way the OIRA process now works. Many,
many rules linger at OIRA long past the 90- or 120-day
deadline.178 Many pre-rule actions stay long past 10 days.179
Some rules have been at OIRA for years.180
176. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(2)(A), (B), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
177. Id. § 6(b)(2)(C).
178. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov (last
visited Nov. 9, 2013).
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Sunstein explains that, in fact, the prevailing understanding
of EO 12,866 holds that an agency head may, on her own, request
an indefinite extension of OIRA review.181 This would mean that
neither the requirement that the OMB Director agree “in writing”
to the extension nor the requirement that the extension be once,
for 30 days only, holds under the present understanding of EO
12,866. This would, in turn, mean that if an agency head asks for
an extension, there actually is no deadline for completing OIRA
review.
This remodeling of EO 12,866’s structure on the timelines for
review is news in and of itself. Many outside observers believe
that there is in fact a deadline for OIRA review.182 OIRA itself
encourages this (mis)understanding by displaying 90 days as a
timing benchmark on its regulatory dashboard.183
But it is worse than that. It is worse because the way that
agency heads come to request extended review, in my experience,
is that OIRA calls an official at the agency and asks the agency to
ask for an extension. It is clear, in such a phone call, that the
agency is not to decline to ask for such an extension. Thus, not
only is there no deadline for OIRA review, but OIRA itself
controls the agency’s “requests” for extensions. In this way, it
comes to pass that rules can remain at OIRA for years.
Quite apart from not knowing when OIRA review ends, it is
also sometimes hard for the public to know when OIRA review
begins. It has been widely reported that OIRA has lately been in
the habit of not allowing agencies to send rules for review until
OIRA has cleared them for review – a kind of pre-clearance
procedure uncomfortably reminiscent of the Bush-era failure of

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1846-47 n. 37.
182. See, e.g., Megan R. Wilson, Printers to Obama: Please Regulate Our
Cleaning Rags, THE HILL’S REGWATCH (Apr. 29, 2013), available at
http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/pending-regs/296827-printers-to-obama-pleaseregulate-our-cleaning-rags (“Laws stipulate that the agency then has 90 days to
review the drafts before returning them to agencies for correction or
publication…”).
183. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public
(last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
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OIRA to be in receiving mode when the endangerment finding
and rules on cars went over for review.184
Some documents on publicly available websites corroborate
these reports.
EPA maintains a website, the Regulatory
Development and Retrospective Review Tracker (“Reg DaRRT”),
that is supposed to track important moments in the development
of EPA rules.185 Inspired by the Bush-era fiasco of the unuploaded package on endangerment and cars, EPA designed a
timeline with two dates relevant to OIRA review: one noting the
date when EPA sends a regulatory package to OIRA, and one
noting the date when OIRA “receives” the package.186 A space of
a day or two between these two dates might mean nothing; it
might mean that the package went over late in the day, for
example, and no one was around to upload it at OIRA. But a
space of anything more than that may signal that OIRA has
lapsed into non-receiving mode. Thus, for example, looking at the
Reg DaRRT entry on EPA’s rule requiring electronic reporting by
Clean Water Act permittees, one can see that the rule went to
OIRA on December 22, 2011, but was not received by OIRA until
January 20, 2012.187 It would be unusual to have this long a
space between sending and receipt unless OIRA had identified
some problem with the package.
Comparing EO 12,866 documents on regulations.gov to
OIRA’s own posted review dates can also be illuminating. On
regulations.gov, one can see that EPA sent a rule relating to
renewable fuels to OIRA on November 20, 2012188 – but OIRA

184. See supra text at note 69.
185. US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-588T, FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY
AND SECURITY SYSTEM: FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS
FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
120/110801.pdf.
186. See, among many others, Formaldehyde Emissions Standards for
Composite Wood Products, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/rulegate.nsf/
byRIN/2070-AJ92?opendocument (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (showing date sent
to OMB for review and date received by OMB).
187. NPDES Electronic Reporting Rule, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/
rulegate.nsf/byRIN/2020-AA47?opendocument (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
188. NPRM as Sent to OMB on 11/20/12, REGULATIONS.GOV,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2012-0621-0003
(last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
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itself reports that it received this rule on January 30, 2013.189
Some regulatory actions seem caught forever in email limbo
between EPA and OIRA. A Notice of Data Availability on coal
ash, for example, appears to have been sent to OIRA on March
12, 2012190 – but the notice did not appear on OIRA’s log of items
under review until April 13, 2013.191 Needless to say, even if
OIRA did indeed respect the EO 12,866 deadlines once items are
accepted by it for review, these deadlines would mean little if
OIRA simply does not accept certain regulatory actions for review
or only accepts them long after they have been sent.
To sum up, on the matter of deadlines, OIRA has broken
entirely free from the constraints of EO 12,866. The 10-day, 45day, and 90-day time limits on OIRA review perhaps survive as
benchmarks, but nothing more. To maintain the fiction that
deadlines still exist, OIRA extends review indefinitely at the
“request” of agency heads – but these requests, in my experience,
often are instigated by OIRA itself. To make matters worse,
OIRA has fudged its own failure to meet the deadlines imposed
by EO 12,866 by simply not “receiving” some regulatory packages
until long after they are sent.
E. What Are We Told?
The last facet of the common law of EO 13,563 compounds
the problems created by OIRA’s other innovations to the
regulatory review process prescribed in EO 12,866: OIRA follows,
and allows the agencies to follow, almost none of the disclosure
requirements of EO 12,866. OIRA also nowhere has written
down the elements of its common law of regulatory review. This
is why we are left to speculate about who is in charge of
regulatory review. This is why so many people think OIRA
reviews only really big and important rules, and perhaps why
189. Entry on RFS Renewable Identification Number (RIN) Quality Assurance
Program,
OFFICE
OF
INFO.
AND
REGULATORY
AFFAIRS,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistReviewSearch (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
190. Standards for the Management of Coal Combustion Residuals Generated
by Commercial Electric Power Producers, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/
opei/rulegate.nsf/byRIN/2050-AE81?opendocument. (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
191. OFFICE OF INFORMATION & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, www.reginfo.gov (last
visited Oct. 16, 2013).
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some believe that agencies can easily evade OIRA review
altogether. This is why outsiders think there actually are
deadlines for OIRA review and also think OIRA’s website
contains a full listing of items under OIRA scrutiny. The
misconceptions about OIRA review would not be possible if OIRA
either actually met the disclosure requirements of EO 12,866 or
were more forthcoming about the many alterations it has made to
the process described in the executive order.
OIRA does not explain in writing to agencies that items on
their regulatory agenda do not fit with the President’s agenda.192
OIRA does not keep a publicly available log explaining when and
by whom disputes between OIRA and the agencies were elevated.
Indeed, when the first elevation of an EPA rule occurred in
President Obama’s first term, I drafted a brief memo for the
EPA’s docket explaining that elevation had occurred and noting
the outcome. OIRA told me in no uncertain terms that the memo
must not be made public. Moreover, except in one instance –
President Obama’s direction to then-EPA Administrator Lisa
Jackson to withdraw the final rule setting a new air quality
standard for ozone – OIRA has not returned rules to agencies
with a written explanation about why they have not passed OIRA
review.193 Instead, as discussed above, OIRA simply hangs onto
the rules indefinitely, and they wither quietly on the vine. This is
how it comes to pass that a list of chemicals of concern or a
workplace rule on crystalline silica lingers at OIRA for years.
Some agencies do post “before” and “after” versions of rules
that have gone to OIRA. These redlined documents often feature
hundreds of changes. There is nothing here like the “complete,
clear, and simple manner” of disclosure contemplated by the
Executive Order. There is also often no document that explains
which changes were made at OIRA’s behest. Where, as Sunstein
explains, changes might come from OIRA, from another White
House office, from another Cabinet head, or from a career staffer
192. The next several paragraphs are drawn from Lisa Heinzerling, Who Will
Run the EPA?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (April 2013), available at
http://jreg.commons.yale.edu/who-will-run-the-epa/.
193. The website on regulatory review shows only one return letter (on ozone)
issued during the Obama administration. OIRA Return Letters, OFFICE OF INFO.
& REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters (last
visited Mar. 25, 2013).
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in a separate agency, the failure to follow the Executive Order’s
rules on transparency means that no one is ultimately
accountable for the changes that occur. Who is responsible, for
example, for the hundreds of technical changes made to the EPA’s
scientific analyses of air quality rules?194 We simply do not know.
Here, too, OIRA is the stumbling block when it comes to
transparency. Agencies know full well that they are not to be too
transparent.
OIRA reprimanded the EPA when the EPA
accidentally posted interagency comments on its proposal to
regulate coal ash impoundments.195 But why shouldn’t the public
know who is responsible for changing the rules? In fact, without
knowing the expertise and affiliation of the kibitzers, it is hard to
evaluate their comments.
The problems go deeper still. OIRA maintains a “Regulatory
Review Dashboard” that contains a good deal of information
about rules under review, how long they have been under review,
and so on.196
It is spiffy and informative, but woefully
incomplete. Some rules go to OIRA “informally” and do not
appear on the Dashboard at that time. Some rules go to OIRA
and appear on the Dashboard only weeks after the agency has
sent them.197 Some rules are done, from the agency’s perspective,
194. Wendy Wagner has painstakingly documented such changes in a study
prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States. WENDY
WAGNER, SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING
APPROACHES (2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf.
195. See CENT. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, CHANGES TO COAL ASH PROPOSAL PLACE
UTILITY’S CONCERNS ABOVE PUBLIC HEALTH (2010), available at
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11041 (recounting the same episode).
196. See generally OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS; OFFICE OF MGMT.
AND BUDGET, REGULATORY REVIEW DASHBOARD, http://www.reginfo.gov (last
visited Oct. 8, 2013).
197. For example, compare the EPA’s report of when it sent its rule on
electronic reporting regarding water pollution permits to OIRA on, Dec. 22,
2011, to its report when OIRA “received” the rule on, Jan. 20, 2012. See NPDES
Electronic
Reporting
Rule,
EPA,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/rulegate.nsf/byRIN/2020-AA47?opendocument (last
visited Nov. 9, 2013) (listing dates for “NPRM: Sent to OMB for Regulatory
Review” and “NPRM: Received by OMB”). See also Search Results for NPRM
Review Status, Regulatory Review Dashboard, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (search “RIN” for
“2020-AA47” and search “Agency for Environmental Protection Agency)
(showing OMB’s received date to be Jan. 20, 2012).
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but the White House prevents their transmittal to OIRA.198 The
truth is, the Dashboard purports to be, but is not, a full picture of
the items under review at any given time. Thus it misleads at
the same time it informs.
So far I have explained the ways in which OIRA review, as
practiced today, departs from the executive order it purports to be
following, EO 12,866. I have suggested, along the way, reasons to
think OIRA’s practice may not be ideal. Now, I turn to the
normative perspective in earnest, and explain why I believe
OIRA’s process of regulatory review is deeply problematic along
several different dimensions.199
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH OIRA
In this paper, I have focused mainly on a descriptive account
of the OIRA review process as it exists today. I believe this
descriptive account is essential because there is so much
misunderstanding about how OIRA actually operates. But this
paper would be incomplete without a discussion of the normative
problems created by OIRA’s current practices. Other scholars
have covered these problems well;200 for this article, I rest with a
relatively brief discussion.
I lead off with the last topic I covered in discussing the
common law of EO 13,563: transparency. The opacity of the
OIRA process has two large problems. The first is that opacity in
government in general is a problem. It prevents people from
understanding the way their government operates, how they can
intervene and at what points, what the government is up to, who
is making important decisions, why the government has made
198. Juliet Eilperin, Obama Administration Slows Environmental Rules as it
Weighs
Political
Cost,
WASH.
POST,
Feb.
12,
2012,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-12/national/35442360_1_mercuryemissions-obama-administration-light-trucks (stating that the White House had
not given EPA permission to send a rule on cars and trucks to OMB).
199. For a compelling argument that OIRA review is so problematic that it
should be scrapped altogether, see Steinzor, supra note 6.
200. Indispensable articles in this literature, spanning a long period, include:
Steinzor, supra note 6; Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 53; Thomas O.
McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 443 (1987); Percival, supra note 51; Morrison, supra note 17; Olson,
supra note 49.
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those decisions. The problems with opacity are, in fact, what led
President Clinton to include disclosure requirements in EO
12,866 in the first place.201
Another problem with opacity in the OIRA process is that
transparency is promised but not delivered. Opacity about
transparency is the worst kind of opacity; people think a lack of
information on a subject means there is nothing relevant to
report, when in fact it might mean they are just not being told.
Thus it is especially troubling, given the gaps in transparency I
have described, that Sunstein continues to tout the transparency
of the OIRA process.202 If believed, this claim would lull people
into thinking they have all the information they might need or
want about this process. But they do not. Moreover, to claim
transparency but offer mostly opacity is especially bad in an
administration that has made openness in government one of its
signature initiatives.
A second problem with OIRA review as it is now conducted is
the one flagged by OLC in 1981 when it reviewed EO 12,291.
OLC cautioned, as I have said, that displacement of discretion by
White House personnel might run afoul of the laws lodging
discretion within a particular agency or with a particular official
at a particular agency.203
Since that time, the academic
literature on this issue has burgeoned, with many scholars on
both sides of the political divide arguing that certainly the
President has the authority to order political appointees within
the agencies to make particular decisions.
Perhaps most
famously, then-professor Elena Kagan argued that statutes that
give discretion to particular agencies or to particular officials
within particular agencies are best read as implicit delegations of
authority to the President to dictate specific regulatory
outcomes.204 Other scholars have followed Kagan’s lead and
argued that it is nonsensical to read much of anything into
Congress’s particular choices about who is to make particular
201. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 878 (2003).
202. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1854.
203. Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. O.L.C. 59,
62-63 (Feb. 13, 1981).
204. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2288-90.
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regulatory decisions.205 What sense would it make, they ask, for
Congress to give the President the authority to designate
Superfund sites but not to give him directive authority over the
setting of the NAAQS?206 Some statutes give authority to the
President, many others to agencies, and there appears to be no
rhyme or reason in these choices.207
But if having rhyme or reason is a prerequisite for respecting
Congress’s choices, we have a lot of work to do unraveling its
handiwork. Congress also has given USDA authority over meat
but not cheese,208 it has given FDA authority over eggs but not
egg products,209 it has given EPA authority over open waters but
it requires EPA to share its authority over wetlands with the
Army Corps of Engineers,210 it has given DOT authority over fuel
economy standards but not tailpipe standards for greenhouse
gases.211 The law is filled with delegations of authority that do
not make obvious sense. But no one argues that FDA could just
take over USDA’s meat inspections, or that EPA could take over
the Army Corps’ functions with respect to wetlands. Even more
tellingly, few other than those who believe in a strongly unitary
executive believe that the President can simply ignore Congress’s
choices about whether the head of an agency can be removed for
any reason or must only be removed for cause.212 Yet it makes
little sense, as far as I can tell, to have an independent SEC but a
dependent EPA, or to have an independent FTC but a dependent
CPSC. Why should we think nothing of ignoring Congress’s
instructions as to who within the executive branch should make
particular decisions, but then cling tightly to its instructions
about how to remove particular officials?

205. See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory
Authority Over Agency Action, 79 FORD. L. REV. 2455 (2011).
206. Id. at 2466.
207. Id. at 2466-68.
208. See US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 185, at 3, 21.
209. 21 U.S.C. 331 § 331 (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 1031 (2012). For a critique of the
resulting regulatory patchwork, see Note, Reforming the Food Safety System:
What If Consolidation Isn’t Enough?, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1357-59 (2007).
210. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
211. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
212. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 25, at 2326-27.
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To delve fully into these issues would take me beyond the
scope of this paper. My basic point is that it is not at all obvious
that a delegation to a specific agency to make a specific decision
delegates authority to the President to make that decision
himself. It is even less obvious that such a delegation gives
decision-making authority to OIRA career staff, other agencies’
career staff, Cabinet members outside the relevant agency, the
White House Chief of Staff, and others, apart from the President.
Even if one believed that the President himself has decisionmaking power, Sunstein’s account of the way the OIRA process
actually works shows that it is almost never the President
himself who is making the relevant calls, it is OIRA career staff
and other agencies’ career staff and other Cabinet officials and
the Council of Economic Advisors and the White House Chief of
Staff and a cast of many others.213 To suggest that all of these
players somehow can appropriately partake of the President’s
own power is ludicrous. It would be to suggest that the entire
executive branch is “the President.”
Thus, as in 1981, there remains a significant legal issue
whether OIRA may exercise decision-making authority – not just
oversight – with respect to regulatory decisions lodged by statute
in particular agencies.
A third large problem with OIRA review as it is now
conducted is that it lacks accountability. No one knows who is
really in charge. Sunstein’s account of the process has only
deepened the impression that the process is chaotic and
unpredictable, lacking clear lines of authority and producing
outcomes that have no clear author. The precise process set out
in EO 12,866 for resolving disputes between the action agency
and OIRA has given way to a blurry struggle for power in a
process that remains opaque and mysterious even to the closest
participants in it. Chaos, opacity, mystery: these are not the
hallmarks of accountability. Since OIRA review is founded in
part on a perceived need for greater accountability in the
regulatory domain, the absence of accountability in this process
undercuts the very reason for that review.
213. See Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1855-59; see also
Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 53, at 68 (counting 19 different White
House offices involved in OIRA review).
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The accountability deficit is worsened by officials’ insistence
that, despite all that I have shown here, it really is the agencies
that are in charge of regulatory policy. Sunstein reports that
“[a]gencies decline to accept changes with which they disagree”
and that “[w]hen changes are made, the agency assents to
them.”214 “It is true, of course,” Sunstein allows, “that OIRA has
a good deal of formal authority under Executive Orders 12866
and 13563. That authority matters. But in important cases, the
agency convinces OIRA and others, on the merits, that its
position is indisputably correct, or that it is reasonable enough
even if not indisputably correct. And in important cases, the
agency concludes that the views suggested by OIRA, and pressed
by interagency reviewers, are clearly correct, or that they are
reasonable enough even if not clearly correct.”215 I do not know
why Sunstein believes that agencies come to understand that
OIRA’s positions are “clearly correct”; I believe, instead, that they
often come to understand simply that OIRA is clearly in charge.
But the continuing assertion that agencies accept OIRA’s views,
even welcome them, further dilutes accountability for the
regulatory decisions in question.
Last but not least, the current process of OIRA review hits
environmental protection especially hard. EPA most often leads
the federal pack in terms of the number of its rules under review
at any given time. Most of the EPA rules OIRA reviews are not
economically significant. As of May 7, 2013, 15 of the 22 EPA
rules under review had been there for over a year. As shown in
redlined versions of EPA rules showing changes during OIRA
review, OIRA devotes extreme attention – and sometimes little
deference – to EPA’s technical judgments.216 Whole categories of
rules protecting the environment fare poorly in the cost-benefit
analysis OIRA demands.217 Perhaps it is not surprising that a
centralized structure first developed in the Nixon years to
undercut protections under the new federal environmental laws
would still, in 2013, save its strongest fire for these same
protections. But it is a shame that so little has changed.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1847.
Id. at 1873 (footnote omitted).
See text at note 165 & note 194, supra.
See text at notes 144-46, supra.
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Solving at least some of these problems with OIRA review
would be simple: OIRA could just follow the rules laid down in
EO 12,866. If OIRA followed EO 12,866’s requirements for
transparency, a good number of the issues surrounding OIRA’s
opacity would disappear. If OIRA followed the spirit of 12,866
and 13,563 insofar as they do not envision OIRA changing the
laws under which agencies operate, the problem of OIRA
interfering with the agencies’ best judgments about the
appropriate interpretations of the statutes they administer would
go away. If OIRA followed the process EO 12,866 requires for
elevation and dispute resolution at the highest levels, and if
OIRA followed the disclosure requirements pertaining to such
matters, some of the concerns about accountability would be
mitigated. If OIRA kept to EO 12,866’s deadlines, at least
indefinite delay would not be one of the intrusions it visits upon
the agencies. If OIRA sent return letters to agencies when it
rejected rules, explaining in writing why it rejected them, there
would exist a focal point for substantive discussion and
accountability would be enhanced. Much can be done to improve
things, in other words, simply by following the executive order
President Obama himself has reaffirmed.
Other problems would be trickier to resolve. There would
remain the overarching legal issue of whether it is fair to assume
that statutes giving decision-making authority to executive
agencies also give decision-making authority to the President (or
his aides in OIRA and the larger White House). If the cast of
thousands Sunstein describes still played a role in regulatory
review, there would remain a serious accountability deficit. And,
so long as the culture at OIRA does not change and so long as
cost-benefit is the decision tool of choice, environmental
protection will suffer.
IV. CONCLUSION
I hope that the descriptive account I have provided here,
aimed at correcting the misimpressions that have grown up
around OIRA review, will help to renew the debate over the role
of OIRA and the larger White House in agency rulemaking.
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